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KENM.LEVY

ABSTRACT I argue for three conclusions. First, responsibility skeptics are committed to the
position that the criminal justice system should adopt a universal nonresponsibility excuse. Second,
a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some of our most deeply held values, further
dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater number of
innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. Third, while Saul Smilansky's 'illusionist'
response to responsibility skeptics - that even if responsibility skepticism is correct, society should
maintain a responsibility-realist!retributivist criminal justice system - is generally compelling,
it would not work if a majority of society were to convert, theoretically and psychologically,
to responsibility skepticism. In this (highly improbable) scenario, and only in this
(highly improbable) scenario, the criminal justice system would need to be reformed in such a
way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility-skeptical beliefs and attitudes.

1.

Introduction

Responsibility skeptics generally believe three things. 1 First, genuine moral responsibility,
the kind of responsibility that depends on metaphysical libertarianism ('libertarian free
will'), 2 is either physically or metaphysically impossible. Second, the only responsibility
realist alternative to metaphysical libertarianism, compatibilism, 3 should also be repudi
ated but for different reasons, one of which is that it equally lends support to retributivism,
the theory that criminals should get their 'just deserts'. 4 Responsibility skeptics reject
retributivism primarily because they believe both that it is unjust in itself and that its
widespread adoption helps to make our criminal justice system so dysfunctional - overly
punitive, highly inequitable, and counterproductive. 5 Third, in order to reform our
criminal justice system - in order to make it more just, equitable, humane, and
constructive - we should uproot this toxic foundation. Instead of talking about
moral/criminal responsibility and retributive justice, we should talk only about causal
responsibility, especially social causation and systemic racism, and restorative justice. 6
To this extent, the responsibility-skepticism movement intersects with the criminal justice
reform movement. 7
In the end, however, many of us responsibility realists want the very same things as
responsibility skeptics. We too want, among other things, to minimize the number of
people who are punished for crimes that they did not commit or punished too harshly
for crimes that they did commit. So the main locus of contention between responsibility
skeptics and responsibility realists does not concern our ultimate goals but rather the
best means to achieving these shared goals.
My argument that responsibility skeptics have adopted the wrong means will fall into
two parts. First, I will argue that responsibility skeptics are committed to adopting a
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universal nonresponsibility excuse in the criminal justice system. Second, I will argue that
a universal nonresponsibility excuse would diminish some ofour most deeply held values,
further dehumanize criminals, exacerbate mass incarceration, and cause an even greater
number of innocent people (nonwrongdoers) to be punished. So even if responsibility
skepticism were the correct theory of responsibility, it does not follow that we should
overhaul the criminal justice system to reflect it.
To this extent, I agree with Saul Smilansky's 'illusionism', according to which society is
practically better off with a responsibility-realist criminal justice system, a criminal justice
system that presumes adults are morally responsible for their choices and behavior, even if
this widely shared presumption is false. 8 But my agreement with Smilansky assumes
a particular background condition: that most of society remains committed, both
theoretically and psychologically, to responsibility realism. If a majority of citizens were
to convert both theoretically and psychologically to responsibility skepticism, as current
responsibility skeptics think they should, then Smilansky's illusionism would no longer
hold. Instead, this hypothetical society's criminal justice system would need to be reformed
in such a way that it aligned with the majority's responsibility-skeptical beliefs and attitudes.

2.

Even IfResponsibility Skepticism Were True, A Criminal Justice System
Would Still Be Necessary

One implication ofresponsibility skepticism might seem at first to be that criminal punish
ment is no longer, and never was, justified. If genuine responsibility is impossible and
therefore criminal defendants are not at all genuinely responsible for their actions, just
as the rest of us are not genuinely responsible for ours, then it seems grossly unjust to
blame and punish them - as unjust as it would be to frame and punish a person who is
known to be innocent. 9 And if it is grossly unjust, then, like any other grossly unjust insti
tution (for example, slavery), we should get rid of it. 10
This argument, however, assumes what responsibility skeptics actually reject: retributi
vism - once again, the theory that criminal punishment is predicated on just deserts. If
genuine responsibility is impossible, then there is no such thing as just deserts. Nobody
deserves anything (good or bad), at least not on the basis of their decisions or behavior,
because nobody is genuinely responsible for anything they choose or do. 11 So this justifi
cation for criminal punishment falls away. 12 But it does not follow that criminal punish
ment is completely unjustified and should therefore be abolished; there may just be
other nonretributivist justifications for it.
Even if it were always (grossly) unjust to punish anybody for criminal misconduct, we
would still need to do something with criminals, especially criminals who have demon
strated a willingness to violate other people's supremely valued interests and rights (e.g.
life, liberty, property, and physical wellbeing). 13 Yes, criminal punishment carries great
costs, both economic and noneconomic, including injustice. But these costs are still out
weighed by the benefits, primarily minimization of future crime. 14 If we were simply to
abolish the criminal justice system and exonerate all offenders, even with expressions of
severe disappointment and exhortations to self-betterment, we would be sending the
message that there will no longer be any real consequences for breaking the law. And this
message would quickly lead to anarchy. 15 The number of crimes, and therefore the
number of innocent victims, would skyrocket. Society would quickly descend into a state
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of nature - a postapocalyptic, dystopian world in which roving gangs competed for ever
dwindling resources. (See 'The Walking Dead'.)
Responsibility skeptics, then, cannot (and typically do not) claim that we should just
abolish the criminal justice system. This position is far too nai:ve and unrealistic. 16 Instead,
the only reasonable position for responsibility skeptics to adopt is that 'nonretributive
sanctioning', 'quarantine' for at least the most serious crimes,1 7 is a necessary evil, an
unjust practice (given criminals' lack of desert) without which even grosser injustice
would ~esult. 18

3.

Responsibility Skeptics Are Committed to Replacing the Traditionally
Recognized Excuses with a Universal Nonresponsibility Excuse

In Section 2, I argued that responsibility skeptics are committed not to abolishing the crim
inal justice system per se but only to putting it on a fully nonretributivist foundation. 19 In a
responsibility-skeptical criminal justice system, it would still be necessary for public safety
- as Gregg Caruso puts it, 'the protection of society and the prevention of harm to others'
and 'the right of self-defence and defence of others' 20 - to incapacitate people who have
proven themselves to be dangerous. Given this new foundation, however, the traditionally
recognized excuses - automatism, duress, entrapment, infancy, insanity, involuntary intox
ication, mistake of fact, and mistake of law - are suddenly far too limited. 21
The traditionally recognized excuses are generally thought to be essential parts of the
modern criminal justice system. 22 The reason that they are thought to be essential is to
prevent injustice. Take, for example, the insanity defense. The reason why most states,
the federal government, and the military provide an insanity defense is because they believe
that (a) criminal responsibility requires moral responsibility and (b) insanity negates moral
responsibility. 23 But from (a) and responsibility skeptics' belief that genuine moral respon
sibility is impossible, it follows that genuine criminal responsibility is impossible as well. So
for responsibility skeptics, it makes no sense to maintain the insanity defense for the purpose
of assessing blame and punishment. Because sane defendants are just as nonresponsible as
insane defendants, it is arbitrary and unjust to exempt only the latter, not the former, from
blame and punishment. The same naturally applies to the rest of the recognized excuses as
well. It is equally arbitrary and unjust to limit exonerations to the defendants who satisfy one
of these defenses. This approach unfairly leaves out all ofthe defendants who do not satisfy
any of these defenses but are just as nonresponsible as those who do.
Responsibility skeptics, then, are committed to replacing the recognized excuses with a much
broader excuse, a 'universal nonresponsibility' excuse that applies to everybody not because of
any cognitive deficiencies or situational constraints but simply because of a metaphysical
deficiency: their universal human inability to be genuinely responsible for their crimes. 24

4.

Moving to a Responsibility-Skeptical Criminal Justice System Would Be
Highly Counterproductive

In the previous section, I argued that responsibility skeptics are committed to abolishing
the recognized excuses and replacing them with a universal nonresponsibility excuse. In
this section, I will argue that recognizing such an excuse - that is, moving from a
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responsibility-realist/retributivist criminal justice system to a responsibility-skeptical/
nonretributivist criminal justice system - would be highly counterproductive. All else
being equal, a responsibility-skeptical/nonretributivist criminal justice system would be
even less humane than a responsibility-realist/retributivist criminal justice system.

4.1.

Things We Deepry Value

Some philosophers argue that responsibility, or at least a belief in responsibility, is
necessary for things we deeply value. The list includes accountability, agency, autonomy,
cooperative living, dignity, forgiveness, gratitude, humanity, justice, love, meaning,
meaningful relationships, morality (moral behavior, motivation, and obligation), objec
tive value, personhood, respect, self-pride, and self-respect. 25 Take dignity, for example.
Most adults believe that their dignity, which they deeply value, would be severely impaired
by others' perception that they are not responsible for their choices and behavior. 26 Such
impairment tends to yield devastating effects, including learned helplessness (i.e. fatalistic
resignation), diminished cognitive self-efficacy, and lower self-esteem. 27 More generally,
responsibility skeptics, who insist that we rip some or all of these personal and interper
sonal foundations away, even if only in the context ofthe criminal justice system, are play
ing with fire. In their admittedly good-faith, zealous effort to reduce injustice, they risk
causing not only even greater injustice but also serious and widespread psychological
and social harm.
In response, Derk Pereboom argues that none of the values (or valuable things) listed
above really require responsibility in the first place and therefore that we could retain them
all even ifwe were to abandon the concept entirely. 28 For example, it may at first seem as
though abandoning responsibility would obligate us to abandon backward-looking
accountability. But abandoning responsibility would obligate us to abandon only the
negative emotions that often accompany backward-looking accountability, indignation,
and resentment, not necessarily accountability itself. And these two emotions are no
more necessary to successfully hold adults accountable than they are to successfully hold
children accountable. 29
I offer two responses to Pereboom's position here. First, it would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for many people, no less everybody, to start assuming that both they
themselves and everybody around them are never genuinely responsible for their decisions
or behavior. 30 Second, psychological and practical difficulties aside, such a society might
be able to retain criminal punishment as well as most or all of the valuable things listed
above, but their degree of value would significantly diminish. If human beings really have
no genuine responsibility at all for their decisions or actions, then it is not clear what
distinguishes them from equally cognitively and emotionally sophisticated robots. While
I might place some stock in a sophisticated robot's emotions and attitudes toward me,
its complete nonresponsibility for these, and for their underlying judgments, would make
them far less important to me than the identical emotions and attitudes of a (presumed)
responsible human being.
For example, all else being equal, I would be much prouder to receive a job offer from a
hiring committee composed of discriminating scholars who came to a consensus about me
after careful discussion than a hiring committee composed of programmed, algorithm
following computers. And that's just pride. The same arguably goes for forgiveness, grat
itude, love, and so on; good or bad, they mean much more to me coming from responsible
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beings, beings that have more or less appropriate standards and are capable of judging and
discussing the extent to which I do or do not measure up to those standards, than from
nonresponsible beings.
Responsibility skeptics will likely respond that even if all of this judging and discussing
by a group of humans may be more meaningful to me than whatever activities a collection
of robots and computers engaged in, they are more meaningful to me not because the
people doing the judging and discussing have genuine responsibility but rather because
people's capacities to do all of this judging and discussing are more impressive than the
capacities of even the most sophisticated machines. But I maintain that it is primarily in
virtue of humans being responsible - specifically, in virtue of their being creatures who,
unlike computers and robots, can make judgments about me and are capable ofparticipat
ing in 'justificatory dialogue' about these judgments 31 - that I take them more seriously.
Judging and dialoguing are both highly complex and creative acts, so complex and creative
that we still have not figured out how to build such capacities (programs) for the most
advanced machines, at least not at the same level as our own. No currently existing robot
or computer, for example, could write an article like this, understand critical feedback,
and make substantial revisions in light of this feedback.
Intuitively, then, these cognitive and highly creative capacities seem to depend on
something much more intricate, something metaphysically richer, than mere rationality
or reasons-responsiveness. This more intricate, metaphysically richer something - what
metaphysical libertarians typically mean by free will and agency- is precisely what respon
sibility skeptics deny the existence of. Such a denial, however, is too reductive. By imply
ing that the difference between an ultimately human-authored creation (such as this
article) and even the most advanced ultimately machine-authored creation is only in
degree, not in kind, free-will skepticism misses just how splendid, even sublime, our cog
nitive and creative (and emotional) capacities are. 32
Just imagine your reaction ifyou learned that this article was written and revised entirely
by a newly developed robot at one of our leading universities. Once you overcame your
initial disbelief, you would be astonished - not because this article is brilliant but because
the very capacity to write it, something we philosophers tend to take for granted, is itself
wondrous. The awe-inspiring nature of this capacity- again, free will or agency, what sep
arates humans from the most advanced machines - is what I think responsibility skeptics
overlook when they suggest that free will simply does not exist and therefore does not con
tribute to some, most, or all of our deepest values. 33

4.2.

Even More Mass Incarceration and Injustice

As I argued in Section 2, even if the criminal justice system dropped all concern with
culpability, one of the principal justifications for criminal punishment, it would still need
to incapacitate the more serious criminals for nonretributivist - primarily consequentialist
and protective - reasons. But I argue that, however justified it might still be, all of this
criminal punishment without any concern for culpability would inevitably increase the
(unjust) punishment ofpeople who are 'doubly innocent' - innocent not only in the sense
of being nonresponsible, as everybody supposedly is according to responsibility
skepticism, but also in the sense of being nonwrongdoers. Some of the doubly innocent
would be prosecuted in good faith; the government would genuinely believe that they were
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sufficiently dangerous. Others would be prosecuted in bad faith; the government would,
for whatever reason, frame them.
Generally speaking, people who may seem dangerous but have not committed a crime
cannot be imprisoned because, as a society, we believe that an element of every crime,
actus reus (bad act), is necessary for culpability. 34 But Elizabeth Shaw argues that a
responsibility-skeptical society would still need to retain actus reus for three
nonculpability-based reasons: citizens' rights (a) to fair notice (otherwise known as the
'legality principle'), 35 (b) against deprivation of liberty without due process, and (c) to
be evaluated for dangerousness on an individual rather than statistical basis. 36
The first two justifications are plausible. The third justification is also plausible but
leads to a significant problem. According to the third justification, actus reus is good
evidence that a person is dangerous - that is, likely to commit another such actus reus in
the future. 37 Put in criminological terms, a history of criminal behavior is a risk factor
for future criminality. 38 But if being a risk factor for future criminality is a good, if not
sufficient, reason to criminalize it (that is, to make it an element of a crime), then it would
seem that other risk factors should be criminalized as well. There are at least seven:
(1) 'antisocial, procriminal attitudes, values, and beliefs, and cognitive emotional states
(e.g. anger, rage, and criminal identity)'; (2) 'having pro-criminal friends and a lack of
prosocial friends and acquaintances'; (3) 'temperamental and personality factors' such
as egocentrism, hostility in personal relationships, lack of empathy, and lack of
self-control; (4) family problems such as 'low levels of affection, poor parental
supervision, and outright neglect and abuse'; (5) 'low levels ofpersonal educational, voca
tional, or financial achievement'; (6) 'low involvement in prosocial leisure activities'; and
(7) 'abuse of alcohol and/or other drugs'. 39 Currently, in our responsibility-realist society,
law enforcement is not supposed to decide who to arrest and who not to arrest on the basis of
risk factors (1) through (7) because all ofthem together, even iffully manifested by a partic
ular individual, do not amount to criminal culpability (with the exception of illegal drug
use). If, however, society were to adopt responsibility skepticism and thereby abandon
any concern for culpability, then - as Shaw claims - one of the main reasons for continuing
to retain actus rei in criminal statutes would be public safety. And ifpublic safety, not culpa
bility, were now the primary or sole basis for criminalizing actus rei, then - given that the
seven other risk factors would only help to strengthen predictions of crime - there would
be no good reason not to criminalize them as well. Again, concern about culpability would
no longer present a barrier.
But here is the problem: Without this barrier, mass incarceration would only further
increase. Not only many more genuinely dangerous people but also many doubly inno
cent people - again, people who are both nonresponsible and nonwrongdoers - would
end up being incarcerated. 40 The injustice done to the latter group, and the resulting rage
and terror that would spread throughout the community, would arguably outweigh the
public benefit of incapacitating the former group. Caruso offers several moral reasons
(such as the 'principle of least infringement') against punishing individuals excessively
or unjustly, 41 but I think that once culpability was abandoned, such reasons would be
inadequate barriers to punishment for suspected dangerousness. Given human nature,
at least humans' track record for the past few centuries, it is quite likely that even a morally
advanced responsibility-skeptical society would simply override these moral principles by
filling the space previously occupied by culpability with a much more robust, single
minded concern for public safety.
© 2022 Society for Applied Philosophy
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I tum now from actus reus to mens rea ('guilty mind'), which is generally thought to be
equally necessary for culpability. 42 In our current responsibility-realist/retributivist crim
inal justice system, if an individual causes harm to another person without intent, knowl
edge, recklessness, or negligence, she is generally thought to be perfectly innocent and
therefore undeserving ofblame or punishment. The harm was a mere accident and there
fore something that she cannot be reasonably expected to have avoided. 43
But if responsibility skepticism were to replace responsibility realism, then all
harmful actions - whether or not performed with intent, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence - would equally be accidents, equally outcomes for which individuals cannot
be justly blamed. So continuing to require mens rea would serve no purpose.
Suppose that two people, Alan and Billy, killed their wives, Annie and Betty respec
tively, under the same exact circumstances. The only difference was in their mental states:
while Alan intentionally killed Annie, Billy negligently killed Betty. If the criminal justice
system were to abandon all consideration of mens rea, then Alan's and Billy's killings
would be considered morally and legally equivalent. While Alan's is intuitively morally
worse than Billy's, this intuition presupposes that there are different levels of
culpability, 44 a presupposition that would be swept away in a responsibility-skeptical
system.
As it turns out, making every crime strict liability in this way would significantly help
prosecutors and hurt defendants. All that prosecutors would have to prove is that the
defendant committed the actus reus, not that he had any particular mens rea (intent, knowl
edge, recklessness, or negligence) when he committed the actus reus. 45 But this easing of
the prosecution's evidentiary burden would, just like criminalizing risk factors (1) through
(7), inevitably increase the number of criminal defendants who are convicted and
incarcerated.
Shaw argues, however, that there are three good nonretributivist reasons to retain mens
rea even in a responsibility-skeptical criminal justice system: liberty, fair warning, and
moral education. 46 Still, I argue, all three fail. Regarding liberty, Shaw says, 'More people
would actually be detained if the mens rea requirement were abandoned. ' 47 Shaw is
certainly correct here, but maximizing liberty cannot justify retaining mens rea any more
than it can justify adding, for example, a red-hair element to criminal statutes. While a
red-hair element would certainly help maximize liberty for non-red-haired defendants,
it would also be arbitrary and counterproductive - arbitrary because there is no principled
reason to discriminate between red-haired and non-red-haired defendants and counter
productive because letting all the non-red-haired but dangerous defendants go free would
undermine public safety. Likewise, then, with mens rea in a responsibility-skeptical society;
retaining mens rea in criminal statutes just to maximize liberty would be as arbitrary and
counterproductive as requiring red hair just to maximize liberty.
Shaw's response would likely be that retaining mens rea in a responsibility-skeptical
society would not be arbitrary or counterproductive in the same way or to the same
degree as a red-hair element because only mens rea, not red hair, is eligible for the two
aforementioned nonretributivist justifications - again, fair notice and moral education.
But I will now argue that both of these justifications fail as well. Regarding fair notice,
Shaw agrees with H.L.A. Hart's claim 'that the mens rea requirement should be preserved
because individuals will be better able to predict when they will be subject to legal
sanctions than they would be if they could be detained simply because they had performed
a prohibited action. ' 48 But, first, as long as a red-hair element was added to criminal
© 2022 Society for Applied Philosophy
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statutes through the legislative process, it would give just as much notice to all citizens,
red-haired and non-red-haired citizens alike, as the mens-rea element does. Second, while
Shaw's/Hart's point applies well to actus reus, it does not apply well to mens rea. Consider
homicide, for example. If a person in a society that had eliminated mens rea from their
homicide statute killed a pedestrian while driving negligently, her complaint that the stat
ute failed to give her fair notice ofthe prohibition against negligent killing would be totally
implausible. Clearly, a strict-liability homicide statute (that is, a homicide statute that
omitted mens rea) would give citizens fair notice that any killing - not only intentional kill
ing and knowing killing but also reckless killing and negligent killing - are all prohibited.
Strict liability in this context would be highly problematic, but failure to give fair notice is
not the reason.
Finally, Shaw argues that a responsibility-skeptical society would have to retain mens rea
in its criminal statutes because (a) every offender must be morally appraised in order to
serve the 'forward-looking goal' of moral education, 49 which itself serves the forward
looking goals of rehabilitation and reconciliation, 50 and (b) such moral appraisal requires
taking into account her state ofmind at the time she committed the crime. 51 But even ifwe
accept (a) and (b), we need not accept Shaw's conclusion. In a responsibility-skeptical
society, mens rea might be important in determining sentencing - which could be deter
mined entirely by forward-looking goals like rehabilitation and reconciliation - but it
would not be necessary to determine guilt (i.e. to determine whether the defendant should
be convicted). And if mens rea would not be necessary to determine guilt, then it would not
need to be retained in criminal statutes.
One might try to salvage Shaw's position by arguing that there is yet a fourth nonretri
butivist reason to retain mens rea in a responsibility-skeptical criminal justice system:
maximizing public safety. Return to Alan and Billy. It could be argued that Alan is clearly
more dangerous than Billy; the fact that Alan intentionally killed his wife and Billy 'only'
negligently killed his wife seems to license the prediction that Alan is more likely than Billy
to kill again and therefore that Alan should be incapacitated for a proportionally longer
time than Billy. 52 Indeed, Alan seems to exhibit to a much greater extent than Billy two
of the seven risk factors above: (1) 'antisocial, procriminal attitudes, values, and beliefs,
and cognitive emotional states (e.g. anger, rage, and criminal identity)' and (3) 'tempera
mental and personality factors' such as egocentrism, hostility in personal relationships,
lack of empathy, and lack of self-control.
This argument, ifsuccessful, would show that a responsibility-skeptical system is not so
farfetched because it would more or less track our responsibility-realist/retributivist intu
itions about proportional punishment. 53 But, alas, it is not successful; greater or lesser
exhibition of two risk factors does not provide sufficient guidance about whether, or for
how long, to incapacitate a given defendant. The fact ofthe matter is that risk factors, even
all eight together (the eighth being prior criminality), are not crystal balls. They do not tell
us what will happen, only what is likely to happen. For example, despite first appearances,
intentional killing does not necessarily license a prediction offuture killing any more than
does negligent killing; we can easily imagine some people intentionally killing only once
and some people negligently killing (for example, in the course of driving or hunting) at
least twice. Indeed, while many intentional killers reform themselves, many negligent
killers do not. It is therefore wrong to assume that Alan should necessarily be incapaci
tated for a longer period of time than Billy. On the contrary, an unreformed Billy would
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be (by definition) more dangerous, and therefore should be incapacitated for a l~mger
period of time, than a reformed Alan.

5.

Saul Smilansky's lliusionism Is Not Entirely Correct

While I share responsibility skeptics' goal of reforming the criminal justice system, their
proposed means to achieving this reform would have the very opposite effect. Converting
the criminal justice system into a responsibility-skeptical institution would make it (much)
worse than it already is. It would diminish some of our most fundamental values, further
dehumanize offenders, and lead to great injustice, especially incarceration of even more
individuals, including many nonwrongdoers.
What, then, is a responsibility skeptic to do? On the one hand, responsibility skepticism
seems impractical; on the other hand, responsibility skeptics think that this impractical
theory is true. Saul Smilansky's solution to this dilemma is to accept the theory but reject
its implementation. 54 At first glance, this position seems irrational. Generally speaking, if
an individual believes that proposition Xis true, then it seems irrational for her to operate
as ifXis false. But Smilansky argues that things are different here; that our criminal justice
system, among other institutions and practices, works much better when we assume that
people have 'libertarian free will' (as he calls it) than when we assume that people do not
have libertarian free will- even if the fact of the matter is that libertarian free will is impos
sible. Put slightly differently, the benefits of acting as if (i.e. pretending that) libertarian
free will exists outweigh the costs of demanding perfect consistency between our criminal
justice system and the harsh reality that libertarian free will does not exist.
Smilansky is certainly correct that our responsibility-realist institutions and practices
will work better (i.e. the benefits will outweigh the costs) in a responsibility-realist
society - that is, in a society where most people assume the truth of responsibility
realism - even ifresponsibility realism is false. By analogy, a familial or romantic relationship
will generally work better on the shared assumption that there is mutual love, even if this
assumption is ultimately mistaken. But what if society were evenly divided on the issue of
responsibility realism versus responsibility skepticism? Or more radically, what if
Smilansky's and his fellow responsibility skeptics' arguments for responsibility skepticism
were so famous and compelling that a majority ofsociety came to accept them? What, then,
ofhis recommendation to maintain the illusion ofresponsibility realism - that is, to maintain
institutions and practices that are predicated on a false belief in libertarian free will? 55
It stands to reason that, even if responsibility skepticism is true, responsibility-realist
institutions and practices maintain their prudential superiority only within a larger
responsibility-realist society. So if a majority of society were to convert to responsibility
skepticism - that is, if a majority of society were to agree with Smilansky and his fellow
responsibility skeptics that libertarian free will simply does not exist - it is no longer clear
that the criminal justice system should maintain 'business as usual'. Instead, if the crimi
nal justice system continued to rely on an assumption that a majority of society no longer
held, the assumption of responsibility realism, they would very likely be alienated by the
disconnect. And this alienation would soon mutate into distrust and cynicism, attitudes
that can be seriously corrosive and destabilizing, much more corrosive and destabilizing
than their shared repudiation of libertarian free will itself. 56
© 2022 Society for Applied Philosophy
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Contrary to Smilansky, then, if a majority responsibility-skeptical society is to thrive
rather than fail, the criminal justice system (above all) would need to be radically trans
formed. It would need to make very clear that criminal punishment is not at all based
on culpability in any deep metaphysical sense but rather on the purely forward-looking
considerations of minimizing crime, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. This message
would be well-received because, ex hypothesi, most or all people receiving it would be
responsibility skeptics.

6.

Conclusion

My argument in Section 5 is that a responsibility-skeptical criminal justice system might
work only if there is enough 'buy-in' - that is, only if it is situated within a society that
mostly subscribes to responsibility skepticism. But this is quite an assumption to make.
It is hard enough (at least for responsibility-realists like me) to imagine any sizable
community containing a majority, no less a significant minority, of responsibility
skeptics; 57 it is even harder to imagine how this community would react, both individually
and collectively, to serious crimes. Maybe it would have the strength and ideological
dedication to suppress, ignore, or even avoid the emotional reactions that are grounded
in responsibility realism, especially retributivist emotions like indignation, resentment,
and vengefulness. But if it did not have this strength and ideological dedication, which
seems more likely given humans' responsibility-realist/retributivist 'hardwiring', 58 the
dissonance between their theoretical commitment to responsibility skepticism and their
responsibility-realist/retributivist emotions would pull the criminal justice system in two
opposite directions. And it is difficult to see how this particular institution, and therefore
the larger society that would depend on it for protection of its supreme values (such as life,
liberty, property, and physical wellbeing), could survive this constant tension.

Ken M. Levy, LSU Law School, Baton Rouge, LA, USA. klevy@lsu.edu
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54 See note 8 above and accompanying text. See also Greene and Cohen op. cit., p. 1783.
55 Greene and Cohen (op. cit., p. 1781) predict that questions about free will 'will lose their grip in an age when
the mechanical nature ofhuman decision-making is fully appreciated'.
56 Greene and Cohen (op. cit., p. 1778) state that' [t]he legitimacy ofthe law depends on its adequately reflecting
the moral intuitions and commitments of society'.
57 See Shabo op. cit., p. 108: 'When we reflect on the relevant features of our emotional involvement with others,
it seems doubtful that we could seriously try to adopt the Containment Policy on a large scale'. The Contain
ment Policy, as Shabo (op. cit., p. 106) explicates it, involves 'striv[ing] as far as possible to take the reactive
attitudes out of circulation'.
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58 See Campbell 2011 op. cit., pp. 97-98; Caruso 2015 op. cit., pp. 2828-30; Focquaert et al. op. cit., pp. 236,
239; Greene and Cohen op. cit., p. 1784; K. Levy 2014 op. cit., pp. 651-52, 656--57;Nelkin, Dana Kay. 2011.
Making Sense ofFreedom and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 119; Pereboom 2014 op. cit.,
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